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Analysis of cross-sectional data on tourism to Israel during the Intifada 
reveals some factors driving international tourist behaviour. Much of 
the heterogeneity in the observed response of different nationalities can 
be explained by socio-economic characteristics, some of which suggest 
differences in attitudes towards the risk associated with violence in 
Israel. Analysis of time-series data reveals the importance of different 
dimensions of violence in explaining tourism decline, distinguishing 
between violence affecting perceptions of risk and violence that might 
influence tourists with strong political views. We also see why 
variations in conflict intensity are more important than variations in 
road accidents. 
 
JEL classification: Z19, L83   - 1 - 
I. Introduction 
 
Recent years have seen the establishment of an economic literature (a large part of which is 
reviewed by Frey et al., 2004) devoted to the consequences of violent conflict. Such violence 
will impact on economic decisions to the extent that it affects people’s perceptions about the 
relative risks involved in different activities. One decision in which such risks are most evident 
is the choice of where to go on vacation. Several important international tourist destinations, 
including Israel and the Palestinian Territories, are now severely affected by political violence. 
There is an increasing body of evidence to suggest that violent incidents resulting in only a 
handful of fatalities per year – and therefore representing only a very small risk to an individual 
tourist – have a substantial impact on tourist volumes and tourism revenues. As pointed out by 
Cukierman [2004], the economic effects of a small increase in the current level of violence can 
be magnified when it raises the perceived probability of a substantial escalation of the conflict.
1 
Evidence for such effects in relation to tourism is reported in Enders and Sandler [1991] 
(Spain), Enders et al. [1992] (Austria, Italy and Greece), Drakos and Kutan [2003] (Greece, 
Israel and Turkey) and Sloboda [2003] (USA). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the effects of 
violence on tourism are equally large in developing country destinations such as Bali and 
Egypt. 
Whatever the true nature of the risk, many OECD governments actively dissuade their 
nationals from travelling to Israel. The following quotation from the US State Department 
website (August 3, 2004) is typical of advice given to Western tourists: 
  
'The Department of State warns US citizens to… defer travel to Israel, the West Bank and Gaza 
due to current safety and security concerns.'  
  
Such violence has serious economic repercussions for a tourism destination like Israel, where 
since September 2000 there has been a marked increase in violent conflict between Israeli and 
Palestinian forces (the Al-Aqsa Intifada). Tourist arrivals are now less than half their pre-2000 
level, and between 1999 and 2003 annual tourism revenue fell from $4.3bn to $2.3bn. This fall 
is almost equal in magnitude to the decline in the Israeli Balance of Payments in the same 
period, from a $0.9bn surplus to a $1.3bn deficit. 
  It is not so surprising that the upsurge in violent conflict led to a dramatic fall in the 
number of tourists in Israel. However, this simple statistic leaves many questions unanswered. 
Many people have chosen not to visit Israel any more, but a substantial minority has been 
undeterred by the violence. In this paper we will use time-series and cross-sectional data on   - 2 - 
tourism in Israel to explore the characteristics of these two groups of people. Along the way we 
will find out which dimensions of the violence affect tourists’ choices, and whether variations 
in conflict intensity have more impact than variations the frequency of road traffic accidents. 
We will also explore the factors that drive the differences we will observe in the behaviour of 
tourists from different parts of the world. For example, some commentators insist that there are 
still large cultural differences between Americans and Europeans with respect to risk-taking. In 
the recent words of one Whitehouse spokesperson:
 2 
 
'An American personality… prizes the calculated risk… Europeans often seem bent on 
preventing any chance of trouble arising.' 
 
If this is so, then ceteris paribus we should observe Americans to be less deterred than 
Europeans by the dangers of international tourism, and more inclined to ignore the advice of 
the State Department. 
   Before we discuss our data and our model, the next section of the paper outlines in 
more detail the conceptual framework for the paper. 
 
II. A Conceptual Framework 
 
In this paper we will use two slightly different Israeli datasets to address two key questions 
about the behaviour of tourists. 
 
1. First of all, we can ask a question about the distribution of attitudes towards the risk of death 
or injury faced by travellers. The fact that some – but not all – tourists are staying away from 
Israel these days suggests heterogeneous attitudes towards risk among the tourist population. 
For some – but not all – tourists the higher risk appears to have raised the opportunity cost of 
travelling to Israel above the benefit. The fall in tourist numbers is consistent with the 
existence of discrete groups of people with different attitudes towards risk. Figure 1a illustrates 
this case. (Figure 1 represents a rough sketch of a model that will be outlined in much greater 
detail in section 3 below.) The frequency distribution in the figure indicates the number of 
people, g, who are just indifferent between travelling and not travelling at a certain level of 
risk, z. (Because the number of tourists is declining in the level of risk, we draw g as a function 
of 1/z.) The fact that g is bimodal reflects the existence of two groups of people, a 'timid' group 
clustered around the right-hand mode, and a 'gung-ho' group clustered around the left-hand 
mode. The number of tourists will be the integral of g up to the current level of 1/z. As the risk 
level rises from z1 to z2 between September and October 2000, the timid group drops out of the   - 3 - 
travelling population. Subsequently, small variations in the level of risk around z2 have little or 
no impact on tourist numbers. However, the fall in tourist numbers is also consistent with a 
unimodal distribution, as illustrated in Figure 1b. In this case, there are no identifiable clusters 
with respect to attitudes towards risk. The rise in risk from z1 to z2 again leads to a substantial 
reduction in tourist numbers, but in this case subsequent variations around z2 do have a 
substantial impact on tourist numbers. 
  
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Why does this matter? One reason is that the shape of g around z2 affects the return to marginal 
improvements in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In Figure 1a nothing short of a complete 
return to peace will have any substantial impact on tourist numbers. Piecemeal measures that 
result in a partial reduction in violence cannot realistically be sold to the Israeli or Palestinian 
public on economic grounds. This makes a gradual return to normality very difficult. By 
contrast, in Figure 1b even a small reduction in violence yields an economic return, making 
partial peace agreements easier to sell to the public, and facilitating a gradual return to peace. 
 
2. The second question relates to differences in the attitudes of tourists of different 
nationalities. The distributions in Figure 1 might vary from one part of the world to another, 
because of variations in the (net) benefits to the average tourist from visiting Israel, or because 
of variations in the costs associated with a certain level of risk. For example, the benefits might 
be higher in countries with a large Jewish population. The costs associated with risk might be 
lower in countries where people have learned better how to manage risk, or else have become 
acclimatised to it. People in some places might just be more gung-ho than people elsewhere. If 
there is cross-country variation in the size of the integral of g between z1 and z2, then an 
increase in violence will have markedly different effects on tourist numbers from different 
parts of the world. 
  If we can find correlates of the national characteristics that affect the shape of g, then 
we will be able to explain at least some of the cross-country variation in the decline in tourist 
numbers. As Table V below indicates, this variation has been substantial. This will provide 
evidence on some of the ways in which national characteristics affect attitudes towards risk and 
security. 
 
In order to address the issues raised in the first question, we need to look at tourists’ response 
to changes in the level of violence in Israel after September 2000, to see whether the relatively 
small fluctuations in conflict intensity during the Intifada have been associated with changes in   - 4 - 
tourist volumes. This requires the analysis of time-series data on tourist traffic. The Israeli 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) reports consistent monthly data on the number of American 
tourists and on the number of European tourists checking into Israeli hotels each month. (Data 
on tourist numbers in the West Bank and Gaza, virtually zero since September 2000, are not 
included.) In the next section, we will outline a time-series model that is designed to explain 
variations in these data. If the month-on-month variations in tourist volumes in response to 
fluctuations in conflict intensity are substantial, relative to the large decline in tourism as a 
result of the start of the Intifada, then we are likely to be in the world of Figure 1b rather than 
that of Figure 1a. Small steps towards peace will yield an economic return, making a gradual 
return to normality more likely. As part of this exercise, we will make a careful distinction 
between those dimensions of the conflict that are associated with the direct risk to tourists and 
other dimensions that might have an impact because of tourists’ political views. 
The hotels data are not well suited to answering the second question, because they 
disaggregate only between Americans, Europeans, and others. However, there are also annual 
CBS data on tourist arrivals into Israel, disaggregated by the nationality of the individual 
tourists. These data are not reported at a high enough frequency for time-series analysis, but we 
can construct a cross-section in which the dependent variable is the rate of decline in tourist 
arrivals from each country between 1998-9 (i.e., before the start of the Intifada) and 2001-2.
3 
We can then look at the national characteristics associated with cross-sectional variations in the 
rate of decline.  
Section 3 below first outlines the modelling framework used to analyse the time-series 
data, then presents the results of our analysis. Section 4 deals similarly with the international 
cross-sectional data. 
III. The Time-series Model 
 
3.1 The time-series data: concepts 
Our time-series regression equations ought to be consistent with a plausible model of 
individual decision-making. In this section we expand on the ideas outlined in section 2, 
deriving a regression equation from the discrete choice theory outlined inter alia in Maddala 
[1983].
4 
  The model concerns a population of people who have already decided to take a 
vacation, and are deciding where to go. Let the net utility an individual i derives from taking a 
vacation in location m ∈ {1,..., M} in month t be designated vimt. We will assume that each 
person’s utility is of the form:   - 5 - 
 
vimt = µmt (Xmt, εmt) + uimt          ( 1 )  
 
where µmt is the average level of utility from visiting location m in month t for the vacationing 
population and uimt is an individual’s idiosyncratic deviation from this average. Xmt is a vector 
of identifiable time-varying factors that impact on one’s net utility from a vacation in a 
particular location, and εmt is a stochastic term reflecting the unpredictable component of the 
average utility level (fads and fashions). We further assume that individual i chooses location 
m in period t if and only if: 
 
vimt = max (vi1t,..., viMt)          ( 2 )  
 
It can be shown (Maddala, 1983) that if for any two locations (m, n) the distribution of uimt is 
independent of that of  uint, and if each has a Weibull distribution, then the probability of any 
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(If the only factor influencing the µ ’s were the level of risk, zmt, associated with travel to 
location m, then our model would be as simple as the one depicted in Figure 1, with gmt = 
dpimt/d(1/zmt). However, our model will not be so restrictive.) For a large population, the ratio 
of the number of people in period t visiting location m (pmt) to the number visiting location n 
(pnt) can therefore be written as: 
 




ln(pmt) – ln(pnt) = µmt (Xmt, εmt) – µnt (Xnt, εnt)         ( 6 )  
 
Location m here is to be interpreted as Israel; the identity of the reference location n will be 
discussed later.  If we know the functional forms of µmt (.) and µnt (.), then we can fit equation 
(6) to time-series data. In what follows, we assume that for the data after September 2000 it is 
possible to find a linear specification such that: 
   - 6 - 
ln(pmt) – ln(pnt) = [Xmt – Xnt]′β + εt         ( 7 )  
 
where εt is a linear function of εmt and εnt. Note that we are not assuming linearity across the 
large change in conflict intensity following the onset of the Intifada, only linearity in the 
smaller changes observed since.   
  We will begin with the assumption that [Xmt – Xnt] had four major components. The 
first three are: seasonal factors, the anticipated relative enjoyability of the two locations and the 
relative chances of being a victim of a violent incident in the two locations in this month and 
the next. (Some tourist visits span two calendar months.) The fourth component relates to the 
intensity of those elements of the conflict not associated with a direct risk to tourists. This 
might be important if some pro-Palestinian tourists disapprove of Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank, and if the intensity of their disapproval varies with the intensity of the conflict.
5 
(At the opposite end of the political spectrum, an increase in attacks on Israelis could stimulate 
more pro-Israel “solidarity” tourism. We deal with this possibility by appropriate definition of 
our dependent variable, as discussed in the next section.) Our regressions are based on an 
equation of the form: 
 
ln(pmt) – ln(pnt) =  Σsθs.hst + β1.E[ln(wmt) – ln(wnt)]           (8) 
+ β3.E[ln(zmt+1) – ln(znt+1)] + β4.[ln(zmt) – ln(znt)]  
+ β5.E[ln(fmt+1) – ln(fnt+1)] + β6.[ln(fmt) – ln(fnt)] + εt    
 
hst is a dummy for month s. wmt is the enjoyability of location m in period t, to which an 
expectations operator is attached, because new visitors will only find out whether they like a 
place when they get there. zmt is the probability of being a victim of a violent incident and fmt is 
a measure of conflict intensity not associated with risk to tourists. Terms in zmt+1 and fmt+1 are 
included, because some visits may straddle two calendar months.
6  
One might also wonder whether monthly variations in the relative cost of different 
locations make a difference to tourist numbers. However, as discussed in Appendix 1, our 
empirical measures of relative cost were never statistically significant in any regression 
equation. It seems that between 2000 and 2003, monthly variations in cost had no substantial 
impact on tourism to Israel. 
  Application of the model requires us to specify the expectations formation process. We 
will work with the following assumptions: 
 
E[ln(wmt) – ln(wnt)] = α1(L)[ln(pmt-1) – ln(pnt-1) ]        ( 9 a )  
E[ln(zmt) – ln(znt)] = α2(L)[ln(zmt-1) – ln(znt-1) ]       ( 9 b )    - 7 - 
E[ln(fmt) – ln(fnt)] = α3(L)[ln(fmt-1) – ln(fnt-1) ]         ( 9 c )  
 
where the α(L)s are lag polynomial operators. Equation (9a) builds some herding behavior into 
the model: if a destination has been popular in the past, people are more likely to consider it 
today.
7 Equation (9b) states that expectations about the current risk of violence are based on the 
past frequency of similar violent incidents. Equation (9c) specifies a corresponding equation 
for violence not associated with tourist risk. Substituting equations (9a)-9(b) into equation (8), 
we will have an ARDL equation of the form:  
 
γ1(L)[ln(pmt) – ln(pnt)] = Σsθs.hst + γ2(L)[ln(zmt) – ln(znt)] + γ3(L)[ln(fmt) – ln(fnt)] + εt (10) 
 
where the γ(L)s are linear combinations of the α(L)s and the β ’s. 
  It is worth reiterating that the γ2 and γ3 parameters in equation (10) will be statistically 
significant only if in-sample variations in the level of violence are making the difference to the 
vacation location decisions of a substantial number of tourists. This will be the case as long as 
there are a substantial number of people who are roughly indifferent between locations at the 
average level of violence during the Intifada period.  An obvious alternative to equation (10) – 
though not one grounded so well in theory – is a regression equation for ln(pmt) alone rather 
than [ln(pmt) – ln(pnt)]. The stylized facts reported in the next section are also true of regression 
equations of this kind; however, such regressions do not fit the data so well. 
 
3.2 The time-series data: application 
We first discuss the measurement of the variables in equation (10). The equation is to be fitted 
to the monthly hotels data for two tourist populations: tourists from America and tourists from 
Europe. In order to estimate the parameters of the equation, we need to construct a dependent 
variable in which the number of visitors to Israel from a certain population (America, Europe) 
is expressed relative to the number of visitors from that population to other locations. In order 
to focus on the effects of political violence within Israel, it will be convenient to use reference 
locations that are reasonably safe. In the case of American tourists the reference location will 
be Europe,
8 and in the case of Europeans it will be America. That is, for the American tourist 
sample, pmt is interpreted as the number of American visitors to Israel in a particular month and 
pnt is interpreted as the number of American visitors to Europe. For the European tourist 
sample, pmt is interpreted as the number of European visitors to Israel in a particular month and 
pnt is interpreted as the number of European visitors to America.    - 8 - 
For both samples, the monthly transatlantic tourism figures used to measure pnt are 
taken from the dataset published by the ITA Office of Tourism and Travel Industries 
(http://tinet.ita.doc.gov), which reports both American tourists departing to Europe and 
European tourists arriving in America. The monthly Israeli tourism data are published by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics and are available online at http://www.cbs.gov.il. The Israeli 
tourism statistics used to measure pmt are those for American and European tourists checking 
into tourist hotels. One advantage of using hotels data is that organised “solidarity” visits to 
Israel make use mainly of accommodation in Israeli homes, rather than standard tourist hotels. 
So we avoid some downward bias in the absolute value of the γ2 parameter due to solidarity 
visits increasing at times of high violence. 
 Measures  of  zmt and fmt are constructed from data provided by the Israeli NGO 
B'Tselem (http://www.btselem.org). Among other Intifada-related data, B'Tselem records: (i) 
the total number of Israeli fatalities within Israel proper, excluding the West Bank and Gaza 
(WBG); (ii) the total number of Israeli and Palestinian fatalities in WBG. The first of these 
series is used as a measure of zmt. All – or almost all – fatalities within Israel proper, most of 
which are from bomb attacks, are in situations in which tourists are just as likely to be victims 
as Israeli residents. Of course, the vast majority of victims are Israelis, because the resident 
population is so much larger than the tourist population. The second series is used as a measure 
of fmt. Violence in WBG does not pose a direct risk to tourists to Israel, who don't have to go 
there, but liberal-minded tourists might choose not to visit Israel because they lay part of the 
blame for the violence on the Israeli government. It is worth noting at this point that 
disaggregation of WBG fatalities by nationality and by combatant status has no extra 
explanatory power in the regression equations reported in the next section. 
  In addition to the fatality series in Israel, we will include a dummy variable (DGW) for 
the month of the Iraq War (2003m3). American and European tourists are likely to have 
thought travel in the Mid East to be more risky during the war, or at least during the first 
couple of weeks. The use of dummy variables in time-series regressions is never ideal: the 
interpretation of dummy coefficients is always open to question. But we have no other way of 
capturing the effect of the Gulf War, and removing the dummy from the regression does not 
substantially alter our estimated long-run elasticities.
9 
In all cases we assume that znt = fnt = 0: there is no political violence in Europe or 
America. Our sample period does encompass September 2001; but the attacks in America 
made all overseas air travel more daunting for Americans, regardless of their destination. It 
also seems to have been perceived in Europe as increasing the risk of air travel generally,   - 9 - 
rather than air travel specifically to America. In any case, a dummy variable for 2001m9 is not 
statistically significant in the regression equations reported below.  
Figures 2-3 depict the time-series [ln(pmt) – ln(pnt)], ln(zmt) and ln(fmt) in each of our two 
samples. Table I provides some descriptive statistics for the variables for our sample period 
(2000m9-2004m2, or 42 observations), as well as for the period before the onset of the 
Intifada. The table shows how much the mean values of both tourism and conflict intensity 
have changed: the Intifada represents a large structural break. As in many other empirical 
applications, it is unclear whether the variables are I(0) or I(1) over the 2000m9-2004m2 
sample period: standard tests reject neither null at conventional levels of significance. So it is 
appropriate to re-parameterize equation (10) in error-correction form. Employing such a re-
parameterization of equation (10) with the restriction that znt = fnt = 0, and also allowing for the 
Gulf War dummy, we have: 
 
η1(L)∆[ln(pmt) – ln(pnt)] = Σsθs.hst + η2(L)∆ln(zmt) + η3(L)∆ln(fmt)     (11) 
   + ϕ1.[ln(pmt-1) – ln(pnt-1)]+ ϕ2.ln(zmt-1) + ϕ3.ln(fmt-1) + δ.DGWt + εt 
 
where the ϕ ’s capture the long-run levels relationship between the variables.
10 In both the 
American and the European sample, the lag order used to fit equation (11) is 1. This lag order 
minimizes both the Schwartz-Bayesian and Akaike information criteria for the respective 
regressions equations. Pesaran et al. [2001] provide critical values for the F-statistic for the 
null that  ) 0 ( = ∀ x x ϕ  under (i) the assumption that all variables are I(0) and (ii) the assumption 
that all variables are I(1). If the null can be rejected in both cases, then there is evidence that 
there is a long-run relationship between the variables.  
 
[Table I and Figures 2-3 here] 
 
Table II reports the regression results for the American tourist sample and Table III reports the 
regression results for the European tourist sample.
11 In both cases there are two regression 
equations, an unrestricted one corresponding to equation (11), and a second equation that omits 
insignificant components of the dynamics. T-ratios on lagged level parameters (the ϕ ’s) should 
be treated with some caution, since the variables might not be stationary. However, the F-
statistics for the joint significance of the ϕ ’s are always greater then the upper bounds reported 
in Pesaran et al. [2001], so there does seem to be a statistically significant long-run relationship 
between the variables. Recursive estimation of the equations over the last 12 months of the 
sample suggests that the key model parameters are stable over time, and that the results are   - 10 - 
robust to changes in sample size (Figures 4-5 depict the one-step ahead forecast errors for each 
equation, and Figure 6-7 depict the recursively estimated ϕ coefficients.). 
  One important point to note in the tables is that in both samples the γ2 coefficients are 
significantly larger in absolute value than the γ3 coefficients. That is, tourists respond more to 
one extra fatality in Israel than they do to one extra fatality in WBG. So a regression equation 
conditioning tourist numbers on total fatalities alone would be mis-specified. Some tourists do 
care about those parts of the conflict not associated with a direct threat to their personal safety, 
but this effect is relatively small. 
  Rather than discussing individual coefficients in the dynamic regression equations, we 
will base our comments on the results depicted in Table IV and Figures 8-9. Table IV indicates 
the long-run coefficients on each of the explanatory variables implicit in the unrestricted 
equations in Tables II-III. Figures 8-9 summarize the dynamics of these regression equations 
by plotting the response of the dependent variables to a temporary (one-month) unit increase in 
ln(zmt) and ln(fmt) over a six month-period.  
Table IV shows that a 1% rise in Israeli fatalities, as captured by zmt, will, if sustained, 
result in a 0.31% decline in American tourists and a 0.44% decline in European tourists; the 
difference between these figures is statistically insignificant. It also shows that a 1% rise in 
WBG fatalities, as captured by fmt, will, if sustained, result in a 0.17% decline in American 
tourists and a 0.07% decline in European tourists; the difference between these figures is 
statistically insignificant. The coefficients on the DGW Gulf War dummy are -0.99 and -1.23 
respectively; again, the difference between these two numbers is statistically insignificant. So 
both American and European tourist numbers are sensitive to monthly variations in the 
magnitude of violence. This suggests that there are substantial numbers of people – both in 
America and in Europe – who are approximately indifferent between travelling to Israel and 
not, even at post-2000 levels of violence. The distribution in Figure 1b appears to be more 
appropriate here than the one in Figure 1a. The population (at least, the population of tourists) 
is not divided into discrete 'gung-ho' and 'timid' groups. As a consequence, small variations in 
conflict intensity do have a substantial impact on tourism. 
Figures 8-9 show that the response to a change in conflict intensity is remarkably swift. 
For both Americans and Europeans, and for both dimensions of the conflict, the decline in 
tourism after a temporary (one-month) intensification of the conflict appears in the first three 
months following. From month 4 onwards, tourism numbers recover to their initial level.  
  It appears from the time-series data that there is no substantial difference between 
American and European responses to changes in the level of risk associated with visiting Israel   - 11 - 
since September 2000; certainly, there is no evidence that Europeans are more risk-averse. 
However, the cross-sectional data discussed in the next section will provide more detailed 
evidence on international differences in responses to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 
[Tables II-IV and Figures 4-9 here] 
 
One often-quoted statistic in relation to the Intifada is that fewer people die in the conflict than 
in road-traffic accidents. In fact, if we look at the monthly CBS accident data, we see that there 
are indeed fewer conflict deaths in Israel, but there are more conflict deaths in WBG. 
Moreover, the variance of the log of road-traffic fatalities since September 2000 is less than 
half the variance of either of our conflict measures. In addition, there is no significant 
autocorrelation in deseasonalized monthly road fatalities, so last month’s fatalities do not 
provide any extra information about how dangerous Israeli roads are this month (whereas there 
is some information in past levels of violence, as outlined in Appendix 2). Nevertheless, it is 
worth looking at the impact of changes in road-traffic fatalities on tourist flows. So we also 
fitted a regression equation of the form 
 
η1(L)∆[ln(pmt) – ln(pnt)] = Σsθs.hst + η2(L)∆ln(zmt) + η3(L)∆ln(fmt) + η3(L)∆ln(RTFt) (11a) 
   + ϕ1.[ln(pmt-1) – ln(pnt-1)] + ϕ2.ln(zmt-1) + ϕ3.ln(fmt-1)  
   + δ.DGWt + ϕ4.ln(RTFt) + εt 
 
where  RTFt is the number of road-traffic fatalities per month. Since ln(RTFt) is clearly 
stationary,
12 the t-ratio on ϕ4 on can be taken at face value, as an indicator of the significance 
of the long-run effect of road-traffic fatalities on tourist numbers. For the American sample this 
t-ratio is 0.18; for the European sample it is 0.09, so there is absolutely no evidence that 
variations in road-traffic fatalities have had any impact on tourism. (This is also true if Israeli 
road-traffic fatalities are scaled by foreign – f or example, American – fatalities.) But given the 
low variance and insignificant autocovariance of ln(RTFt), it would be somewhat rash to 
interpret the insignificance of ϕ4 as proof that tourists are more sensitive to the high-profile 
conflict risks emphasised in the media than they are to more mundane risks they face on the 
road.
13  
IV. The Cross-sectional Model 
 
4.1 The cross-sectional data: concepts 
In the cross-sectional model, we intend to explain international variations in the decline in 
tourism to Israel between 1998-9 and 2001-2. By analogy with section 3.1, we will focus on   - 12 - 
the growth in the probability that the i
th individual from a certain origin k will visit destination 
m, ∆ln(pimk), and the corresponding growth in the actual number of tourists travelling from k to 
m, ∆ln(pmk). We expect that these quantities will be negative for the majority of countries of 
origin. Note that the cross-sectional index k replaces the time-series index t. By analogy with 




= ∆ − ∆ = ∆
M j
j jk mk imk p
1 ) exp( ln ) ln( µ µ         ( 1 2 )  
 
where ∆µmk is the mean growth in the net utility of k-residents from visiting m. We will further 
assume that there is no substantial cross-sectional variation in the change in the desirability of 
locations other than Israel between 1998-9 and 2001-2.
14 In terms of equation (12) this means 
that if we take destination m to be Israel, ∑ ≠ ∆
m j jk ) exp( µ  is a constant. For no country does 




j jk 1 ) exp( µ  is also likely to 
be approximately constant. Call this constant ∆µ. Our problem then reduces to modelling the 
determinants of ∆µmk. Again, we assume that it is possible to find a linear representation, this 
time of the form: 
 
∆ln(pmk) = ∆µmk – ∆µ = Wmk′ζ + εk         ( 1 3 )  
 
where the Wmk are factors affecting the net utility from visiting Israel that vary according to the 
tourist’s place of origin, and εk is a cross-sectional residual. 
The elements of W that appear in our regression equations are rather different from 
those in X. First of all, our cross-sectional data, discussed in the following section, measure 
total tourist inflows, not just hotel check-ins, and therefore include family and “solidarity” trips 
to Israel on tourist visas. It is therefore important to control for the substantial variation in the 
relative size of Jewish populations in different parts of the world. In the US, the Jewish 
population makes up about 2% of the total population, but in other countries the fraction is 
very much smaller. Accurate data on the religious affiliation of tourists is not available, but it 
seems reasonable to suppose that a disproportionately large fraction of tourists to Israel are 
Jewish. Moreover, these tourists might on average be more willing to visit Israel, even in the 
presence of violence, because of family ties or political commitment. So countries with a larger 
Jewish population might exhibit a smaller decline in tourism to Israel. Israelis also market 
religious tourism packages for Christians, but Christians are unlikely to have the same political 
commitment to the State of Israel. If we include in the regression an estimate of the percentage   - 13 - 
of the population that attends church regularly, taken from the World Values Survey, it is not 
statistically significant. Still, it is possible that there are some additional, unmeasured cultural 
factors affecting political opinions that contribute to the residual εk. 
  Secondly, the rate of decline in tourism might depend on the social and economic 
characteristics of the country of origin. In countries where there is a high level of violent crime 
residents may have learnt better how to avoid potentially dangerous situations, or they may 
have become less sensitive to the risks associated with living in a violent society. (Either they 
are not subject to the morbid and arguably irrational fears that beset tourists from very safe 
countries, or they are subject to cognitive dissonance regarding the risks they face, as in 
Akerlof and Dickens [1982].) But even for a given level of crime, there may be a connection 
between the level of risk tourists are familiar with and the level of economic development in 
the country they come from. It is reasonable to assume that all international visitors to Israel 
are reasonably wealthy, relative to the world average: otherwise, they could not afford to 
travel. Those arriving from poor countries are atypically rich for their homeland; those arriving 
from rich countries are not especially wealthy, relative to the rest of their population. Because 
of their wealth relative to those around them, the first group may have more experience of 
being a potential target of criminals; so they may be more acclimatised to a high level of 
personal security risk, and less sensitive to the risks currently involved in visiting Israel. 
  Thirdly, we ought to allow for changes in economic conditions in the country of origin 
between 1998 and 2002. The insignificance of such effects in the time-series regressions does 
not mean that they will be insignificant in the cross-sectional regressions. Two potentially 
important factors are the growth of the country’s real exchange rate with respect to Israel – 
capturing changes in the cost of travel there – and the growth of it’s real per capita income. A 
high rate of income growth might lead to a greater overall level of international tourist 
departures from the country and ceteris paribus a higher level of tourism to Israel.
15 
  Allowing for all of these factors, the cross-section regression equation that we will 
estimate is of the form: 
 
∆ln(pmk) = ζ0 + ζ1.ln(1+PJk)  + ζ2.Vk + ζ3.ln(PCYk) + ζ4.∆ln(Ck) + ζ5.∆ln(Yk) + εk   (14) 
 
where  PJk is the proportion of the population of k that is Jewish, Vk is an indicator of 
lawlessness in k, PCYk is a measure of per capita income in k in 2000, ∆ln(Ck) is the growth of 
k’s real exchange rate with respect to Israel between 1998-9 and 2001-2 and ∆ln(Yk) is the 
growth of its real income between these periods. 
   - 14 - 
4.2 The cross-sectional data: application 
∆ln(pmk) is measured using data reported by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics and 
available online at http://www.cbs.gov.il. For each tourist origin k we calculate the logarithm 
of the ratio of tourist arrivals in 2001 and 2002 combined to that in 1998 and 1999 combined. 
(Annual data for 2000 are difficult to interpret because the Intifada began in the middle of this 
year.) The ratios (not in logs) are reported in Table V. We have excluded Arab countries from 
the data set, because tourists from the Arab world might be subject to varying visa 
requirements over the sample period. Otherwise, we report data from all countries listed by the 
CBS for which we can measure each element of Wmk. It can be seen that there is substantial 
variation in the data. For three countries – Hong Kong, Malaysia and Italy – the ratio is less 
than 20%, but for another four – Ukraine, Belarus, South Korea and Uzbekistan – the ratio is 
over 100%.
16 That is, there were a few countries from which tourist arrivals actually increased 
after the start of the Intifada. It turns out that the figures for Hong Kong, Malaysia and Italy are 
outliers in the distribution of ∆ln(pmk). Inclusion of these three countries in the sample makes 
the distribution of ∆ln(pmk) significantly non-normal. At the very bottom end of the distribution 
there might be some non-linearity in the data generating process for ∆ln(pmk). (There are no 
outliers at the other end of the distribution.) However, with only 57 observations in all we do 
not have enough degrees of freedom to model non-linearities in the tail. For this reason we 
adjust the figures for the three countries, raising them all to -1.5 (implying a ratio of 22% in 
Table V). A discussion of alternative ways of dealing with the non-normality is available on 
request: the results reported in section 4 are generally robust to the alternatives. 
 
[Table V here] 
 
The Jewish population figures are taken from those published at www.jewishpeople.net; PJk is 
calculated by dividing these figures by the total population estimates published in the World 
Bank World Development Indicators. PCYk is PPP adjusted per capita GDP in US Dollars, as 
reported in the United Nations Human Development Report 2001. Ck is calculated as the ratio 
of the GDP deflator in k to that in Israel, scaled by the value of the Sheqel in k-currency. 
Average figures for 1998-9 and 2002-2 are calculated, and ∆ln(Ck) is the growth rate between 
the two periods. ∆ln(Yk) is constructed in an analogous way, with Yk measured as real (2000) 
US Dollar GDP from World Development Indicators for 1998-9 and 2001-2. 
  Two alternative measures of Vk are considered. The first is the log of the number of 
reported homicides per 10,000 inhabitants in 2000, ln(Hk), reported in the UN World Crime   - 15 - 
Survey. This is available for 53 of our 57 countries. We expect ∆ln(pmk) to be increasing in 
ln(Hk). The second, available for all 57 countries, is the 2000 Rule of Law measure described in 
Kaufmann et al. [2003] and here designated as ROLk. This measure aggregates national scores 
awarded for the perceived level of crime in a country, the reliability of the judiciary and the 
enforceability of contracts. It is therefore a very much wider and more subjective indicator of 
the degree of lawlessness in society. Since higher scores are awarded to more lawful societies, 
we expect ∆ln(pmk) to be decreasing in ROLk. Note that this variable is constructed as an index 
ranging in value from -2.7 to +2.7, and is approximately normally distributed; it appears in the 
regression in levels, not in logs.  
Table VI reports the results of fitting equation (14) to the data, first of all using the 
ln(Hk) measure, then using the ROLk measure. The explanatory variables account for about half 
of the sample variation in ∆ln(pmk). All variables except ∆ln(Ck) and ln(Hk) are statistically 
significant at the 5% level, and all significant coefficients have the anticipated sign. The 
significance level for ln(Hk) is just above 10%, and it does not explain as much of the sample 
variation as the alternative measure ROLk. However, with the exception of ln(PCYk), the 
coefficients on other variables do not vary much between the two regression specifications. 
The ln(PCYk) coefficient is sensitive to the specification because poor countries are much more 
crime-ridden, so ln(Hk), ROLk and ln(PCYk) are highly correlated. When ln(Hk) and ROLk are 
replaced by their corresponding orthogonal components – i.e., the residuals from regressions of 
ln(Hk) and ROLk respectively on ln(PCYk) – the coefficients on ln(PCYk) in the two 
specifications are almost identical. These coefficients are reported at the bottom of the table. 
 
[Table VI here] 
 
The table shows that if the fraction of local population that is Jewish is one percentage point 
higher – for example 1% of the population instead of 2% - then the rate of decline of tourism 
over the sample period is on average 40% lower. This is consistent with large but unsurprising 
differences between Jews and non-Jews – on average – in terms of the deterrent effect of the 
violence. More interestingly, the regression equations with orthogonalized lawlessness 
indicators imply that a 10% increase in per capita income of the country of origin is associated 
with a rate of decline of tourism over the sample period that is around 3.4% higher. Part – but 
not all – of this effect is because a higher per capita income is associated with lower 
lawlessness in a country. Some of the per capita income effect has another source; one 
plausible explanation is that tourists from poor countries are more likely to be wealthier than 
their neighbors, and therefore more accustomed to being targets of violence.   - 16 - 
  Since the Rule of Law variable is an index, the coefficient on this variable is difficult to 
interpret per se. However, the sample standard deviation of ROLk is 0.97, so the estimated 
coefficient shows, approximately, the effect on tourism decline of a one standard deviation 
change in the index. In more law-abiding societies the decline is greater, a standard deviation 
increase in ROLk being associated with an additional 17% fall. The positive coefficient on the 
homicide variable ln(Hk) in the alternative regression specification is consistent with this effect, 
but the standard error on the homicide coefficient is very large, so it is not quite significant at 
the 10% level. Possibly this definition of lawlessness is too narrow. 
  Finally, despite the huge impact of the violence, tourists do seem to be sensitive to 
economic conditions at the margin. Countries with the largest real income growth have showed 
the smallest declines in tourism to Israel, ceteris paribus. Countries with income growth 1% 
higher have shown a rate of tourism decline that is about 1.5% lower on average. However, the 
coefficient on real exchange rate variable is insignificantly different from zero. 
  With regard to the potential differences between Europeans and Americans, the results 
in this section confirm those of the previous section, answering our original question in the 
negative. Table V shows that the value of ∆ln(pmk) for the USA lies in the middle range, only 
one observation away from the median. Some Western European countries (mainly Nordic and 
Southern Mediterranean ones, with lower crime rates and/or a smaller Jewish population) show 
far larger declines in tourism to Israel than does the USA. But others (notably France and the 
United Kingdom, with a lower per capita income) show substantially smaller declines. Once 
we have conditioned on a set of socio-economic characteristics, the remaining variation in the 
data (about half of the total variation) has no obvious socio-economic explanation and is 
uncorrelated with geographical location. In the ROL regression, the estimated value of εk for 
the USA is -0.18, implying a larger decline in tourism than average, conditional on the RHS 
variables in equation (14). This compares with a German εk of -0.11, a French εk of 0.19 and a 
British εk of 0.33; but the sample standard deviation of εk is 0.30, so none of these differences 




Analysis of time-series and cross-sectional Israeli tourist data reveals some of the factors 
driving people’s attitudes towards the risk associated with travel to a conflict region. Time-
series analysis shows that since the onset of the Intifada even the relatively small variations in 
conflict intensity – as measured by the number of fatalities per month – have affected tourist   - 17 - 
volumes. These results reinforce previous studies of the wider macroeconomic impact of the 
Intifada, for example Fielding [2003] and Eckstein and Tsiddon [2004]. This is true of both 
American and European tourists, with no significant differences between the two groups. It is 
consistent with a model in which, even at moderate levels of violence, a large number of 
people are approximately indifferent between travelling and not travelling. As a consequence, 
we can expect even a partial reduction in violent conflict in the region to boost tourism 
revenue, which could be grounds for optimism regarding a gradual resolution of the conflict.  
It is also worth noting that tourists are sensitive not only to deaths within Israel, but also 
(to a lesser degree) deaths of both Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. All 
dimensions of the conflict, and not only Israeli deaths in suicide bombings, have an impact on 
the Israeli economy. In our fitted model, an increase in monthly Israeli fatalities from zero to 
ten deaths, such as would be caused by a large suicide bombing, would reduce American 
tourist numbers by around 30% in the next month and 45% in the month following. (Thereafter 
tourist numbers would swiftly recover.) The estimated effects on European tourist numbers are 
of the same order of magnitude, implying to a total loss of tourist revenue in the order of 
$250mn. An equivalent increase in WBG fatalities would reduce American tourist numbers by 
around 15-20% in the second and third months following. Given that the monthly average 
number of fatalities in WBG is 64 (as opposed to five in Israel) Palestinian deaths cost the 
Israeli economy a substantial amount of money. 
  Analysis of cross-sectional data reveals more about the differences, and the absence of 
differences, between tourists of different nationalities. Some socio-economic characteristics 
(such as a high average income levels and a low crime rate) are associated with a larger decline 
in tourist numbers when the violence starts. Tourists from countries at lower levels of 
economic development are less sensitive to the violence. Once we have controlled for these 
characteristics there is no obvious geographical pattern to the variation in tourist behaviour. 
'Old Europe' demonstrates no more and no less risk aversion than the New World. 
  We ought to be cautious in inferring from these results about a sample of tourists 
conclusions about whole populations. In many countries international tourists might not be 
typical of the population in which they live. Nevertheless, the homogeneity of the time-series 
regression results across European and American samples, and the extent to which the 
international cross-sectional variation in tourist behaviour is associated with a few simple 
socio-economic characteristics, create a strong impression that, for a given level of social and 
economic welfare, people are pretty much the same everywhere. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Here we discuss briefly our measurement of the relative cost series, which turned out never to 
be statistically significant in the time-series regression equations. Data on hotel and restaurant 
prices in America, Europe and Israel are available, facilitating the construction of hospitality 
price real exchange rate series. However, such series are unlikely to be exogenous to total 
tourist volumes, and in this context there is no obvious instrument for hotel and restaurant 
prices. For this reason we measured relative costs as an aggregate consumer price real 
exchange rate. For American tourists this was the log of the ratio of the Israeli consumer price 
index to the Euroland consumer price index, scaled by the Shekel-Euro nominal exchange rate. 
For European tourists it was the log of the ratio of the Israeli consumer price index to the US 
consumer price index, scaled by the Shekel-Dollar nominal exchange rate. Nominal exchange 
rate and price indices are reported by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 
(http://www.cbs.gov.il), the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2) and the European Central Bank (http://www.ecb.int). 
Substitution of a (probably endogenous) hospitality price real exchange rate for the aggregate 
consumer price real exchange rate made no difference to the insignificance of relative costs in 
the regression equations. 
 
Department of Economics, University of Otago 
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Table I: Sample Statistics 3½ Years Before and After the Al-Aqsa Intifada 
   1997m3-2000m8  2000m9-2004m2   
    mean s.d.   mean s.d.   difference 
ln(pmt/pnt) (America)  -9.4967  0.2758    -10.4073  0.4416    -0.9106 
ln(pmt/pnt) (Europe)  -9.0252  0.3087    -10.0658  0.3993    -1.0406 
ln(fmt)      0.6885  0.7413       4.1661  0.6565      3.4776 
ln(zmt)      0.2142  0.5525       1.5756  1.2755      1.3614 
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Table II: American Tourist Time-Series Regression Results 
Standard errors are calculated using White’s heteroskedasticity correction. 
A. Unrestricted equation for ∆ln(pmt / pnt) 
variable  coefficient  standard error    t ratio  partial R
2 
∆ln(pmt-1/pnt-1)   0.02831  0.08276      0.34207  0.0050 
∆ln(zmt)  -0.12125  0.04538     -2.67188  0.2349 
∆ln(zmt-1)   0.00951  0.05351      0.17772  0.0021 
∆ln(fmt)  -0.01666  0.02165    -0.76952  0.0179 
∆ln(fmt-1)   0.06924  0.02183     3.17178  0.2007 
ln(pmt-1/pnt-1) -1.04140  0.10229  -10.18090  0.7547 
ln(zmt-1)  -0.32112  0.04594    -6.98999  0.5640 
ln(fmt-1)  -0.17344  0.03714    -4.66990  0.5006 
DGWt  -1.03030  0.12059    -8.54383  0.6069 
 
R
2 = 0.94728; σ = 0.13469   
LM residual autocorrelation test: F(1,20) = 0.62967 [0.4368]    
LM ARCH test: F(1,19) = 0.00001 [0.9931]    
Residual normality test: χ
2(2) = 2.2101 [0.3312]    
F-statistic for joint significance of levels variables: F(3,21) = 22.768  
 
B. Restricted equation for ∆ln(pmt / pnt) 
variable  coefficient  standard error    t ratio  partial R
2 
∆ln(zmt)  -0.12484  0.04101    -3.04414  0.2581 
∆ln(fmt-1)    0.07492  0.01693      4.42528  0.2685 
ln(pmt-1/pnt-1) -1.00750  0.07259  -13.87930  0.8475 
ln(zmt-1)  -0.31863  0.03648    -8.73438  0.6889 
ln(fmt-1)  -0.16160  0.02390    -6.76151  0.5190 
DGWt  -1.01760  0.10459    -9.72942  0.6011 
 
R
2 = 0.94601; σ = 0.12751   
LM residual autocorrelation test: F(1,23) = 0.52302 [0.4768]    
LM ARCH test: F(1,22) = 0.19195 [0.6656]    
Normality test: χ
2(2) = 1.0137 [0.6024]    
 
pmt / pnt     ratio of US tourists in Israel to US tourists in Europe 
fmt      1 + total Israeli and Palestinian fatalities in West Bank & Gaza 
zmt      1 + total fatalities in Israel 
DGWt      dummy variable = 1 in 2003m3, = 0 else   - 22 - 
Table III: European Tourist Time-Series Regression Results 
Standard errors are calculated using White’s heteroskedasticity correction. 
A. Unrestricted equation for ∆ln(pmt / pnt) 
variable  coefficient  standard error    t ratio  partial R
2 
∆ln(pmt-1/pnt-1)  -0.10059  0.08268    -1.21662  0.0475 
∆ln(zmt)  -0.04037  0.05112    -0.78971  0.0248 
∆ln(zmt-1)  -0.00547  0.06146    -0.08900  0.0004 
∆ln(fmt)   0.00093  0.02454      0.03790  0.0000 
∆ln(fmt-1)   0.02278  0.02520      0.90397  0.0199 
ln(pmt-1/pnt-1)  -0.68139  0.09645    -7.06470  0.5759 
ln(zmt-1)  -0.29780  0.06944    -4.28859  0.4544 
ln(fmt-1)  -0.04624  0.03411    -1.35561  0.0571 
DGWt  -0.84095 0.07174 -11.72220  0.4305 
 
R
2 = 0.90854; σ = 0.15492   
LM residual autocorrelation test: F(1,20) = 0.64525 [0.4313]    
LM ARCH test: F(1,19) = 1.05240 [0.3178]    
Normality test: χ
2(2) = 0.08624 [0.9578]    
F-statistic for joint significance of levels variables: F(3,21) = 10.395  
 
B. Restricted equation for ∆ln(pmt / pnt) 
variable  coefficient  standard error    t ratio  partial R
2 
ln(pmt-1/pnt-1) -0.69345  0.05716  -12.1317  0.7528 
ln(zmt-1) -0.27551  0.04857  -5.67243  0.6834 
ln(fmt-1) -0.03583  0.02657  -1.34851  0.0626 
DGWt  -0.85763 0.06402  -13.3963  0.4350 
 
R
2 = 0.89462; σ = 0.14945   
LM residual autocorrelation test: F(1,25) = 0.00055 [0.9815]    
LM ARCH test: F(1,24) = 0.01799 [0.8944]    
Normality test: χ
2(2) = 0.23485 [0.8892]    
 
pmt / pnt     ratio of Euro tourists in Israel to Euro tourists in the US 
fmt      1 + total Israeli and Palestinian fatalities in West Bank & Gaza 
zmt      1 + total fatalities in Israel 
DGWt      dummy variable = 1 in 2003m3, = 0 else   - 23 - 
Table IV: Long-Run Levels Elasticities in the Unrestricted Models 
 
      l n ( zm)      ln(fm)      DGW 
US equation        -0.30835        -0.16654        -0.98934      
Standard error          0.04838         0.03255          0.20792      
European equation      -0.43705        -0.06787         -1.23420      
Standard error       0.09012          0.05803          0.36834 
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Table V: Ratio of 2001/2 Tourist Arrivals to 1998/9 Tourist Arrivals 
region ratio  region  ratio 
Hong Kong
§ 0.108410  USA  0.488838 
Malaysia
§ 0.122392  Singapore  0.497907 
Italy
§ 0.180492  Latvia  0.501255 
Sweden 0.262854  Thailand  0.531131 
Slovakia 0.276851  Argentina  0.541050 
Finland 0.282926  Iceland 0.544850 
Denmark 0.293061  Venezuela  0.546745 
Austria
# 0.299289  Mexico 0.555017 
Germany 0.319359  UK  0.603859 
Brazil
# 0.338326  Canada  0.624667 
Portugal 0.339062  Croatia*  0.667670 
Spain 0.352553  Colombia  0.668390 
Japan 0.355187  France  0.680041 
Greece 0.363988  China  0.698051 
New Zealand  0.367148  Serbia/Montenegro
# 0.698519 
Estonia/Lithuania 0.377673  Turkey  0.711101 
Norway 0.380121  Bulgaria  0.784864 
Ireland 0.399542  Russia 0.792463 
Netherlands 0.402578  Moldova  0.799424 
Indonesia 0.420218  Georgia  0.827393 
Australia 0.424272  India  0.830634 
Chile 0.428402  Uruguay  0.863122 
Belgium 0.432385  Romania  0.913361 
Poland 0.435011  Philippines  0.934247 
Czech Republic  0.442142  Ukraine  1.009040 
Cyprus 0.443893  Belarus  1.088937 
South Africa  0.451227  South Korea  1.098650 
Hungary 0.475301  Uzbekistan
# 1.140563 
Switzerland 0.476993     
 
* Includes also Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Slovenia. 
#  No homicide data are available: this country is included in Sample B only. 
§  In the regressions this country’s observation is adjusted to exp(-1.5).   - 25 - 
Table VI: Cross Section Regression Results 
The dependent variable is ∆ln(pmk).  
Standard errors are calculated using White’s heteroskedasticity correction. 
 
Sample A (53 observations)       
variable     coefficient  standard 
error   t ratio  partial R
2 
intercept     1.5214  0.6717   2.2651  0.0711 
ln(1+PJk).100   0.4305  0.1007   4.2764  0.1514 
ln(PCYk)   -0.2729  0.0656  -4.1617  0.1952 
∆ln(Ck) -0.4289  0.3631  -1.1811  0.0199 
∆ln(Yk)   1.5398  0.7296   2.1106  0.0749 
ln(Hk)   0.0766  0.0462   1.6576  0.0452 
        
R
2   0.4597       
σ   0.3228       
χ
2(2) residual normality test   2.3913      
RESET Test: F(3,44)  0.6622       
          
Sample B (57 observations)      
variable     coefficient  standard 
error   t ratio  partial R
2 
intercept     0.8885  0.6646   1.3369  0.0267 
ln(1+PJk).100   0.4526  0.1020   4.4363  0.1729 
ln(PCYk)   -0.1826  0.0739  -2.4709  0.0846 
∆ln(Ck) -0.2302  0.2395  -0.9611  0.0123 
∆ln(Yk)   1.3228  0.5687   2.3260  0.0655 
ROLk   -0.1726  0.0515  -3.3544  0.1118 
          
R
2   0.5258       
σ   0.3091       
χ
2(2) residual normality test  3.0845      
RESET Test: F(3,48)  0.7440       
          
          
ln(PCYk) regression coefficients when ln(Hk) and ROLk are orthogonalized 
          
    coefficient  standard 
error   t ratio  partial R
2 
Sample A  -0.3452 0.045497 -7.58687  0.4494 
Sample B  -0.3405 0.051402 -6.62464  0.3896 
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Figure 2: Tourism series ln(pmt/pnt) 2000m9-2004m2:  
Americans (■) and Europeans (○) 
 



























Figure 5: One-step European sample forecast errors with 2 s.e. bars (2003m2–2004m2) 















































Figure 9: Response of ln(pmt/pnt) to a unit increase in ln(zmt)(■) and ln(fmt)(○), European sample 
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Notes 
 
§. We are grateful for the support of ESRC Grant RES-000-22-0312, which funded the project of which 
this paper is a part. Thanks also to Paul Frijters, Paul Hansen and Frank Stähler, and to seminar participants at the 
Universities of Leicester and Otago for comments on previous drafts of this paper. All remaining errors and 
omissions are our own. 
1. In any case, there is substantial evidence from studies of individual respondents that people’s response 
to the risk of injury in a violent political conflict does not square with Expected Utility Theory, and that they place 
'excessive' weight on highly improbable states of the world with very low utility. Sunstein [2003] and Viscusi and 
Zeckhauser [2003] find that people assessing conflict risk are prone to deviations from EUT common in other risk 
perception contexts; so their behaviour might be better explained by, for example, Prospect Theory.  
2. The quotation is from a speech by M. Daniels, Office of Management and Budget, The Executive 
Office of the President, May 16 2003 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/speeches/daniels051603.html).  
3. The number of tourist arrivals is a little higher than the number checking into hotels, because some 
tourists do not stay in hotels; for example, some stay with friends or family. However, data from the two sources – 
hotels and immigration – are broadly consistent. Some monthly tourist arrival statistics reported by immigration 
are published in the CBS Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, but only for selected months. 
4. The regression specification we end up with is similar in spirit to that of Fleischer and Buccola [2002], 
who analyze total foreign demand for Israeli hotel accommodation up to 1999, but differs from theirs in points of 
detail. They do not formulate an explicit discrete choice model, and do not disaggregate foreign hotel guests by 
nationality. They condition demand for hotel beds on a single lagged “terror index”, and on foreign income and 
tourist expenditure outside Israel (rather than tourist volumes outside Israel). We contend that it is more 
appropriate to use tourist volumes outside Israel as a scale variable when modelling tourist volumes inside Israel. 
They also condition on Israeli hotel prices, using Israeli hotel wages as an instrument. We are not sure that wages 
are really exogenous to the demand for hotel beds and anyway, as documented below, we find prices to be 
statistically insignificant in the post-2000 period. 
5. Of course many tourists may lay the blame for the conflict on the Palestinian authorities, or on militant 
Palestinian groups; this would affect the number of tourists visiting WBG, if there were any to start with. 
6. We take this approach with f as well as with z: there is no reason why the intensity of political 
disapproval should be based on a backward-looking measure of conflict intensity. 
7. There is likely also to be some seasonality in w. Such seasonality should be taken as implicit in 
equations (8-10), and is accounted for in the regressions in section 3.2. 
8. Not everywhere in Europe is safe, but most of the places we see American tourists are pretty quiet. 
9. It does affect our estimated short-run dynamics. Further results are available on request. 
10. The validity of this approach relies on the existence of a single levels relationship. Appendix 2 shows 
that there is no levels relationship between ln(z) and ln(f) as we measure them. 
11. These are OLS estimates; FIML estimates allowing for the non-zero equation residual correlations 
are very similar. 
12. Using data for the period 1988(2)-2004(5), the DF t-statistic for the seasonally adjusted ln(RTF) 
series is -12.19. 
13. Nevertheless, such an asymmetry is consistent with the economic psychology of Kahneman et al. 
[1982], in which larger subjective probabilities are assigned to types of events, such as suicide bombings, that are 
more memorable. 
14. Note that this assumption is consistent with some cross-sectional variation in the level of desirability 
of different locations; such variation is differenced out in our model. 
15. No real income variable is included in the time-series model, which scales tourist volumes in Israel 
by tourist volumes in a reference location. This exclusion would be invalid only if the income elasticity of demand 
for international vacations varied with destination. When an income term is added to the time-series regression 
equations it is statistically insignificant: there is no reason to suppose that there is any such variation in income 
elasticities. 
16. The presence of South East Asian countries in both of these lists suggest that pure geographical 
factors are unlikely to be important determinants of ∆ln(p). When regional dummies are added to the regression 
equations reported in section 4, they are individually and jointly insignificant, including the former Soviet Union 
dummy. Nor is the rate of decline in numbers correlated with the original size of the tourist population: the t-ratio 
for the correlation of ∆ln(p) and the  log of tourist numbers in 1998-99 is -1.514. 